Waterkeeper Summer 06

In 1990, the city stretched 60 miles north to south; today its northern limits are 110 miles from its southern limits. There are no geographic constraints to Atlanta’s growth. Yet, this metropolitan area of more than four million people relies solely on local surface water from its small watershed to sustain its people and its economic prosperity.

The community that has grown into the 11th largest metropolitan area in the country was founded in the 1840s because of its key location for connecting railroad lines, not because of the abundant water resources for industry, transportation or future populations. If city fathers had not convinced the federal government to invest in a major reservoir upstream of the city, Atlanta’s prospects for growth would have been extremely limited by now the sparse water resources.

Before the construction of Lake Lanier, the Chattahoochee was a shallow, warm-water stream known to occasionally dry up in the summer. Its tributaries, which flow through the city’s well-heeled and poor neighborhoods alike, are little more than headwater streams, strongly affected by pollution and the increasing volumes of stormwater from the rapid growth in the 1990s.

One-Hundred-Year-Old Sewer System
Most of Atlanta’s sewer system was built between 1890 and 1930 on the abrupt slopes and narrow floodplains of an Appalachian forest. In 1934, construction began on a new sewer system, financed by the federal Works Progress Administration. Prior to that time, half of all sewage was simply dumped in streams leading to the Chattahoochee River. With each new home, hotel and high-rise office building, the number of connections to the aging system increased. By the 1970s, the city’s sewer system was so overloaded when it rained that it discharged raw sewage directly into city creeks, leaving toilet paper hanging in trees and human waste rotting in stagnant pools. Environmental officials at all levels — city, state and federal — knew about the situation, which threatened public health, recreational areas and property values, but they did nothing.

In a small but old and highly developed portion of the city, rain that flowed into storm drains was funneled into the same system that carried household and industrial sewage to treatment plants. During the torrential downpours with which Atlanta is so familiar, the sudden inflow of rainwater swamped the sewage treatment system. The resulting overflow of stormwater and untreated sewage flowed into creeks and rivers, carrying waste and other matter downstream. In the rest of the city, sanitary sewer overflows (SSOs) polluted neighborhood streams even during dry weather — thanks to decades of failure to maintain, repair and replace 1,800 miles of sewer lines. The city’s three sewage treatment plants were inadequate and ill maintained.

In 1988 a state official declined to publicly release the results of water quality tests in urban streams running through residential areas, saying that he feared some people might use the results to “embarrass” Atlanta. At that time, the prevailing attitude of the Georgia Environmental Protection Division was to hide the problem. If pressed, state environmental officials declared that the city shouldn’t do anything until Congress developed a nationwide policy for treatment of combined sewer overflows (CSOs).

Revolt by Downstream Communities
Award-winning environmental reporter Charles Seabrook investigated the sewer crisis and its impact on the Chattahoochee and West Point Lake, located 65 miles downstream of Atlanta. Seabrook’s hard-hitting articles, which appeared in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution in the late 1980s, declared that West Point Lake was “dying.” He quoted scientists who said that the lake had become the “ultimate pollution sink for Atlanta’s waste” and was “exhibiting the classic signs of death by pollution.”

In 1989 nearly 4 million tons of phosphorus flowed down the Chattahoochee and into the lake every year. In the fall of that year, the city’s R.M. Clayton sewage treatment plant, the largest such facility in the southeast, dumped 200 million gallons of raw sewage into the river during a storm event. Massive spills, such as this one, were routine during the 1980s and 1990s.

Irate citizens took their concerns to the State Capitol and demanded that something be done to protect their lake and the river; they called Atlanta’s sewer disposal system “an abomination” and “a disgrace.” The state passed legislation 1989 and 1990 that banned the use of phosphate detergent in Atlanta. Subsequently, the state issued permits to metro Atlanta sewage plants requiring that phosphorus levels not to exceed 0.75 mg/l. Other state legislation set deadlines for the city to construct treatment facilities at the city’s seven combined sewer overflow locations.

By 1991, the larger Atlanta community was beginning to wake up to the incredible pollution that was flowing through its neighborhoods and downstream to other towns. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution published an article with elaborate maps that was entitled, “Streams of Waste — Atlanta’s economic growth depends on its ability to save its urban waterways.”

Atlanta Neighborhoods
As city officials began to design plans to meet the legal deadlines they ran into significant neighborhood opposition to the construction of five proposed mini-treatment plants. There was little trust between the citizens and a corrupt city government (a situation that did not improve until Shirley Franklin took office in 2001.)

While the downstream communities were demanding immediate improvements to clean up their lake, some Atlanta activists were determined to oppose the city’s proposed sewer cleanup plan for a variety of reasons. In internal memos, EPA scientists called Atlanta’s plans nothing more than “Band-aid solutions.” The city proposed to spend $100 million on mini-facilities that would do little more than screen and disinfect the sewer overflows. Ignoring the concerns of EPA scientists and community members, Georgia state officials issued Clean Water Act discharge permits for these mini-facilities.

In 1993, the City of Atlanta began paying daily fines for failing to comply with state legislative mandates — fines that would ultimately reach $20 million by the end of 1997. That same year, Laura Turner and Rutherford Seydel decided to establish a Riverkeeper program on the Chattahoochee, their home river, and asked the Hudson Riverkeeper to help get things going.

In March 1994, Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper (UCR) was approved as the 11th licensed Waterkeeper group in the country, and the office opened with one employee, a canoe and a $50,000 start-up grant from the Ted Turner foundation.

Riverkeeper Enters the Fray
Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper was not established to focus only on Atlanta’s sewer problems; however, it was clear from the beginning that the organization had to tackle this issue as soon as possible. After reviewing Atlanta’s sewage permit and finding significant violations on the city’s own monthly discharge monitoring reports, Riverkeeper sent a letter to the city of Atlanta and to the state environmental agency in May 1995 expressing grave concerns about the impact of sewage on tributaries to the Chattahoochee and, ultimately, the river itself. We also called attention to problems associated with the completion of upgrades at the city’s sewer plants, especially the R.M. Clayton plant.

Receiving no response, we decided to build a coalition of affected downstream residents and governments to take the next step. In July 1995, two environmental organizations, six local governments, a homeowner, a chamber of commerce and two individuals sent an ‘intent to sue’ letter to the City of Atlanta. The letter alleged violations of the federal Clean Water Act at the combined sewer facilities that discharged into the Chattahoochee River watershed.

Again there was no response from the city, the state or the federal government. So, in October 1995, Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper and our co-plaintiffs filed suit in federal court, represented by local environmental attorney David Pope. As the case made its way through the judicial process, Riverkeeper staff continued to patrol the river and its tributaries, documenting example after example of sewage spills and contamination that were revealed in colorful detail on the pages of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution.

EPA’s Regional Administrator, John Hankinson, decided to conduct a thorough investigation of the city’s entire sewage system in early 1997. And, he insisted that reluctant Georgia state environmental officials accompany his staff on what became a historic five-month joint enforcement review. The regulators made unannounced visits to sewage plants and walked urban streams to determine the extent of the sanitary sewer overflow problem.

In November 1997 federal Judge Thomas Thrash granted a summary judgement in our favor, finding that it was “a matter of undisputed fact that the CSO treatment facilities are dumping massive amounts of proscribed metals and fecal coliform into the tributaries of the Chattahoochee.”

Now the problem became a question of how the city would fix its sewage discharges so that they would meet federal water quality standards.

Negotiations Lead to Settlement
From the day that Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper filed its lawsuit against the city we had clear goals in mind: a federal consent decree, specific deadlines for system upgrades and compliance with water quality standards. We never tried to dictate the cleanup technology, but we were insistent that water quality standards be met by dates certain and we advocated a plan that would clean up the Chattahoochee and its tributaries in the quickest, most cost-effective and efficient manner.

Shortly after the judge’s order was issued, Hankinson suggested that his agency and the state could work with Riverkeeper to settle the combined sewer case. The agencies would then proceed on their own with a legal action to tackle the extensive leaking sanitary sewer problems that plagued the city.

After five months of intensive negotiations in 1998, Riverkeeper and the regulators agreed to a settlement with the city that required a remedial action plan for all of the city’s combined sewer facilities, not just those in the Chattahoochee Basin. The city committed to a 2007 deadline to meet water quality standards at the outfalls. In addition to the $2.5 million cash penalty, the city also agreed to remove every piece of trash from 37 miles of urban streams and to fund a supplemental environmental project — a greenways acquisition program that would invest $25 million in the purchase and permanent protection of streamside lands.

The City’s Sewer Cleanup Plan
In 2001, the city presented its remedial action plan to EPA, the state and Riverkeeper. It included a combination of storage in underground tunnels, treatment and separation of sanitary and storm sewers. Riverkeeper immediately hired Carpenter Environmental to review the concepts presented for any fatal flaws. Engineers Bruce Bell and Steve Garabed found a number of concerns, which we outlined in our comment letter to EPA. These concerns were ultimately resolved by modifications to the city’s sewer cleanup plan.

In January 2002, Shirley Franklin was inaugurated as the first African-American woman to become mayor of Atlanta or any major southern city. She followed eight troubled years in which Mayor Bill Campbell had overseen the 1996 Olympic Games and ended his administration with an $82 million deficit. Campbell’s record on the sewer issues was abominable.

After she was elected mayor, Franklin talked about sewers every chance she got and even dubbed herself the “Sewer Mayor.” She asked Georgia Tech president Wayne Clough to oversee a blue ribbon panel of national experts to review the city’s proposed sewer cleanup plan, and when they approved it, she began work to fund the $3 billion needed for sewer and water infrastructure upgrades.

Funding the Plan
After an extensive and acrimonious campaign to fund the sewer improvements the Atlanta City Council finally approved a substantial sewer rate increase in January 2004. A prominent business leader associated with the Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce said that this vote was possibly one of the most important votes in Atlanta’s history. Riverkeeper worked actively with the mayor and other community groups to help make this happen.

Later that year, Atlanta residents overwhelmingly approved a one-cent sales tax increase for four years to help fix the sewers and cleanup the Chattahoochee and its tributaries. Finally, Georgia’s Republican Governor agreed to help the Democratic Mayor and pledged $500 million in low interest loans.

Looking to a Cleaner River
On October 10, 2005, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution published a retrospective article on this long battle to clean up Atlanta’s sewage problems: “Ten years ago today, the city of Atlanta was routinely spilling raw sewage into the Chattahoochee River from its aging, broken and overwhelmed sewers. On October 10, 1995, the Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper, then a startup environmental advocacy group, filed its first federal lawsuit to force the city to fix its sewers.

“Today, the city is well on its way to spending $3.2 billion to overhaul its water and sewer systems. Sewage spills occur less frequently. And, after years of racking up more than $20 million in fines for missed deadlines, Atlanta is on target to complete upgrades to one section of its sewer system by 2007 and the other by 2014.”

Author Sally Bethea is the Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper.